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1. Introduction 
In the hierarchy of legal acts, the effect of which is aimed at combating corruption, the 
highest level document is the United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopted by the 
resolution 58/4 of the General Assembly on 31 October 2003. 
Article 5, paragraph 3 of this document lays the international legal framework for anti-
corruption expertise: «Each State Party shall endeavor to periodically evaluate relevant legal 
instruments and administrative measures with a view to determining their adequacy to prevent 
and fight corruption». 
At the level of Russian Federation (hereafter “RF”), the cornerstone documents regulat-
ing the conduct of this kind of expertise are the Federal Law #172-FL “On anti-corruption ex-
pertise of legal acts and drafts of normative legal acts” (hereafter “172-FL”) and the Decree of 
the Government of the RF № 96 with the same title, which approved the rules and techniques 
of anti-corruption expertise. 
In accordance with Federal law, anti-corruption expertise of normative legal acts and 
drafts of normative legal acts carried out “…in order to identify factors, which favor the cor-
rupt behavior of agents, and their subsequent elimination. These factors are the provisions of 
normative acts (draft laws and regulations), which establish for the law enforcer unreasonably 
wide margin of appreciation, or the possibility of unjustified use of exceptions to the general 
rule, as well as provisions dealing with uncertain, intractable, and (or) the onerous require-
ments for citizens and organizations and those thus creating conditions for corruption” (Arti-
cle 1). 
From the above article, it follows that the subject of anti-corruption expertise is the 
identification and elimination of the regulation’s provisions, which opens up opportunities for 
corruption or, more broadly, mala fide behavior of law enforcer. Thus, the problem of as-
sessing the quality of the proposed regulation, in the sense that this regulation really enables 
the agents to choose the best alternative for society, currently remains outside the scope of an-
ti-corruption expertise. 
It should be noted that the expertise can be aimed at the separate tools introduced by the 
regulatory act as well at their totality up to the regulatory act in general. 
It seems reasonable to separate the anti-corruption expertise of regulatory tools, which 
have been introduced into the practice for the first time (the expertise of the first type), from 
the expertise of tools with the accumulated practice of enforcement in the framework of the 
corresponding country's regulation system (the expertise of the second type). For example, an-
ti-corruption expertise of amendments to existing legal acts belongs to the second case. 
 In the RF, the “Law on Placement of Orders for Supplying Goods, Executing Works, 
and Providing Services for State and Municipal Needs” (Federal Law #94-FL, hereafter 
“PPL-1”), which came into force on 01.01.2006,  had introduced auction as the primary pro-
curement method. PPL-1 had originally introduced auction in the live outcry form, and then, 
faced with a lot of cases of mala fides of suppliers, replaced live auctions with e-auctions. 
Since by the time of enacting of the law Principal had no information about the contracting 
authorities' response on the new regulation tool, then those time we could apply the anti-
corruption expertise only of the first type. 
On the contrary, by the time of enacting of the new Russian PPL – Federal Law "On the 
contract system in the procurement of goods, works and services for state and municipal 
needs" (Federal Law #44-FL, hereafter “PPL-2”), which came into force on 01.01.2014, there 
were more than three years of applying of e-auctions and there was a lot of information about 
their performance. Hence, in this case we could apply anti-corruption expertise of the second 
type. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follow. 
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In the Part 2 the dramatis personae of public sector agency model (society (or basic 
principal), government (principal) and contracting authority (agent)) and their preferences, de-
fined on the corresponding set of alternatives, will be introduced. 
We’ll separate the bona fide principal (agent) from the mala fide one depending on 
match or differ his preference order from the society’s one. Then we’ll define the extended 
anti-corruption expertise as anti-corruption expertise which starts from the principal bona 
fides identification. 
After that two different algorithms of extended anti-corruption expertise have been in-
troduced: first one is applied to the new regulation tool, second one – to the regulation tool 
which has been used and some information on enforcement practice is available. In both cases 
the expertise starts from the modelling of society’s preferences and comparing them with the 
principal’s preferences generated by the proposed regulation. 
The content of the Part 3 is the case of extended anti-corruption expertise applied to the 
new regulation tool. We consider the linear scoring rule in the form of “Highest bid – Lowest 
bid scoring”, which is applied in the Russian Federation in the public procurement and in the 
procurement stage of the public-private partnership projects. 
The subsections 3.1-3.5 illustrate how algorithm of expertise works. In the subsections 
3.2 we’ll model the preferences of the society. It worth to note that we will not ag-aggregate 
the preferences of public buyers to obtain society’s preference order (Arrow, 1963, p. 23), we 
will put forward some assumptions about society’s preferences, considering the society rather 
as a private buyer who spend his own money and does not care about third party claims 
(Moszoro and Spiller, 2012). 
In the subsections 3.4 we’ll prove that if there are only two bidders then the principal, 
who prescribes to compare their bids by the linear scoring rule, is mala fide. This fact is ex-
tremely important in the institutional conditions of Russian Federation because the average 
number of bids/tender is about 2. 
And, finally, Part 4 gives some policy implications of paper’s finding. 
2. Methods, Models, Algorythms 
As a rule, as a methodological framework for modelling corrupt behavior is used the 
"Principal – Agent" model: “Pathologies in the agency/principal relation are at the heart of the 
corrupt transaction” (Rose-Ackerman, 2008, p. 330). 
This model was developed for describing processes in the private sector and under-
stands the agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the princi-
pal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which in-
volves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
p. 308). Accordingly, the principal faces the task of shaping a system of incentives for the 
agent, in which agent's preference relation, defined on a corresponding set of alternatives, co-
incides with preferences of the principal. 
In turn, the starting point for modeling public sector processes is the assumption that to 
meet public needs the political elite (principal) delegates some decision-making authority to 
government agencies or other public entities (agents). In contrast to the private sector, the use 
of the "Principal – Agent" model in the public sector has its own specifics related to the fact 
that in a democracy the political elite, in turn, is an agent, who elected for the achievement of 
social objectives. Thus, the ideal preferences in this case are not the preferences of political 
elite but society’s preferences and we have some reasons to denote the society as a basic prin-
cipal. 
Assume that the basic principal, the principal, and the agent (hereafter, in the figures 
mostly, BP, P, and A, respectively) equally identify a set of corresponding alternatives Ă , and 
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on this set their preference orders 
BP
 (BPPO),  
P  
(PPO),  , 
A 
(APO), correspondingly, are 
defined. 
Definition 1. We call that the principal (agent) is mala fide (MF) if its preference order 
is different from the basic principal's preference order: 
P 
 
BP
 (
А 
 
BP
), and bona fide 
(BF) if otherwise. 
Consider the problem of anti-corruption expertise of a legal act, enacting a new regula-
tory tool for which there is no law enforcement practice. It appears that in this case the first 
step of anti-corruption expertise is to determine the bona fides of the principal. Indeed, if the 
principal is bona fide, the vesting of agent with principal's preference order will inevitably 
lead to the achievement of public objectives, and otherwise, will not allow of achieving them. 
To determine the bona fides of the principal is necessary, at first, put forward hypothe-
ses about the properties of society’s preferences, build a model of BPPO, then, based on the 
proposed regulation, model the PPO, and, finally, find out whether they match or differ. 
In the first case, tradition anti-corruption expertise (TACE) aimed at the identification 
and elimination of corruptive factors is further applied, and in the second one it is necessary 
to preliminary develop appropriate amendments to the legal document in question. 
Definition 2. Anti-corruption expertise, which includes in its algorithm the identifica-
tion of the principal’s bona fides, is called the extended anti-corruption expertise (EACE). 
Thus, we can depict the algorithm of extended anti-corruption expertise of a new regu-
latory tool (first type EACE). 
 
Fig. 1. The Algorithm of Extended Anti-Corruption Expertise of a New Regulatory Tool 
Let us move on to the consideration of anti-corruption expertise of a legal act that ap-
plies regulatory tool for which there is an enforcement practice. The enforcement practice can 
supply us information for modelling of agent’s preference order, and algorithm of extended 
anti-corruption expertise becomes more complicated than the algorithm shown in Fig. 1. 
Suppose that following the steps 1-4 of the above stated algorithm we have revealed the 
bona fides of the principal. Let us move to the identification of the agency problem’s exist-
ence. 
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 If the accumulated legal practice does not give us reasons to consider agents as mala 
fide, we obtain the model that is trivial in terms of the agency relationships (
P 
 
А 
 
BP
). 
Let us call this model the conflict-free one: agent has the opportunity to choose and is prone 
to selection of the optimal alternative for society.  
When the assumptions for conflict-free model are true the need for traditional anti-
corruption expertise disappears, and researchers tend to focus on the study of the effectiveness 
of public contracts, trying to identify the most completely sources of agency costs and assess 
their value (Laffont, Tirole, 1993), (Moszoro,  Spiller, 2012). 
Assume that the law enforcement practice allows us to identify the existence of agents 
who violate the rules and, possibly, policies of regulation:  
 A
 
P
. They are obviously mala 
fide: 
 A
 
P
  
BP
. Models based on the assumption of principal’s bona fides and agent’s ma-
la fides (
P 
 
BP
, 
А 
 
BP
) are called models of bureaucratic (Jain, 2011, p. 3) or administra-
tive (in the terminology of World Bank) corruption. 
Models of bureaucratic corruption are most frequently used in the study of public pro-
curement issues. Actually, in this case the agent is endowed with a discretionary power and a 
certain budget to carry out procurement. In this situation two of three necessary conditions of 
corrupt behavior arise (Aidt, 2003, p. F633): the relevant public official possesses the authori-
ty to design or administer regulations and policies in a discretionary manner and this discre-
tionary power can allow him the extraction of existing rents or creation of rents that can be 
extracted. 
In the pioneer research based on the assumptions of principal’s bona fides and agent’s 
mala fides Rose-Ackerman examined the situation in which a private individual attempts to 
corrupt a bureaucrat in order to obtain a government contract (Rose-Ackerman, 1975, p. 187).  
In this case agent is considered as a potential “bribee,” and the actual level of corruption is de-
termined by how well the institutions governing the (corruptible) bureaucracy are designed 
(Aidt, 2003, p. F635). 
Modern studies of bureaucratic corruption develop ideas of Rose-Ackerman’s paper and 
are usually associated with the modeling agency costs and / or analysis of the specificity of 
the asymmetry of information between involved parties (e.g., (Lambert-Mogiliansky, Majum-
dar and Radner, 2007), (Coppier,  Piga, 2006)). 
Thus, if the bureaucratic corruption has identified, modeling the behavior of agents is 
made to satisfy the aims of traditional anti-corruption expertise: to identify and eliminate op-
portunities for corrupt behavior and to assess and strengthen the incentives for agent’s bona 
fides. 
Now, we can depict the algorithm of second type EACE in the case of bona fide princi-
pal. 
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Fig. 2. The Algorithm of Extended Anti-Corruption Expertise of a Regulatory Tool with Ac-
cumulated Enforcement Practice: the Case of Bona Fide Principal 
In the bureaucratic corruption model implicitly assumes that the political elite has de-
veloped regulatory rules relying solely on the interests of its principal, society. At the same 
time, consideration of the political elite as an agent hired by the society, naturally leads us to 
perception politicians as “…maximizing agents who pursue their own selfish interest rather 
than as benevolent agents seeking to maximize aggregate welfare” (Grossman and Helpman, 
1994, p. 48). Corruption, directly related to activities of the political elite, was called “grand 
corruption” (Rose-Ackerman, 1996), unlike petty corruption, which is treated in the bureau-
cratic model. 
A. Jain, trying to develop the typology of corruption models, offers to dispose the cases 
of corrupt behavior in between bureaucratic corruption and grand corruption – two extreme 
forms, limiting the scale of corruption activity (Jain, 2011, p. 3). 
In the EACE of a legal act, involving the use of regulatory tool for which there is cer-
tain enforcement practice, improvement the regulation rules, and, possibly, regulatory policy 
are heavily dependent on the specific of agent behavior. 
If we reject the assumption of principal’s bona fides (
P 
 
BP
) and continue to consider 
mala fide agent (
 A
 
BP
), then, depending on whether the agent is prone to break the exist-
ing regulation (
А 
 
P
) or not (
А 
 
P
), we must distinguish between two types of models. 
In the “queue model” (Lui, 1985) and the “auction model” (Beck and Maher, 1986) cor-
rupt bureaucrats try to correct pre-existing government failures. In these models agent’s ac-
tions violate accepted rules of regulation that allows us to identify differences in preferences 
of the principal and agent (
А 
 
P
) and, correspondingly, the agency problem existence. 
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These models, based on assumptions of mala fides of both: a principal and an agent, 
form the class of “efficient corruption” models (
P 
 
BP
, 
А 
 
BP
, 
А 
 
P
) (Aidt, 2003, p. 
F633). 
As an example of this kind of corruption J. Nye viewed corruption of some factory 
managers in the Soviet Union, which gave some flexibility to the centralized planning system 
(Nye, 1967, p. 420), and Laffont and Tirole – some instructions of USA Department of De-
fense (Laffont, Tirole, 1993, p. 476). 
It seems that in the case of an efficient corruption the modeling of agent’s behavior 
must be primarily aimed at the identification and elimination the sources of regulation’s inef-
ficiency and, accordingly, to the conversion of efficient corruption into the bureaucratic one. 
In this case, the result of the anti-corruption expertise is a changing of both: regulatory legal 
acts and regulatory policy. 
Nevertheless, the principal can create a system of incentives for the agent, which will 
warn the latter against taking any action in opposition to existing institutions. This kind of 
model (
P 
 
BP
, 
А 
 
P
) can be called a model of totalitarian corruption. 
Thus, in the case of a totalitarian corruption anti-corruption expertise should be reduced 
to a regulatory impact assessment and the identifying of what underlies the ineffective regula-
tion: vertical corruption (Jain, 2001, p. 73-74) or bounded rationality (Simon, 1961, p. xxiv). 
It should result in a changing of regulatory policy and practices of regulation, especially in 
terms of the expansion of discretionary powers and responsibilities of agents. 
It is easy to note that linear approach of Jain, which limits the scale of corruption activi-
ty by the bureaucratic corruption and grand corruption (Jain, 2011, p. 3), is not quite satisfied 
for constructing the typology of models of corrupt behavior due to, in particular, different 
forms of grand corruption. 
Let us try to construct the typology of models of corrupt behavior, based on combina-
tion of assumptions about bona/mala fides of principal and agent. We combine the above 
mentioned models in the following table. 
Table 1 
The Main Directions of Corrupt Behavior Modelling 
Principal Agent Model Title 
Bona Fide 

P 
= 
BP
 
Mala Fide 

А 
 
 BP
 
Bureaucratic corruption 

А 
 
 P
 
Mala Fide 

P 
 
BP
 
Mala Fide 

А 
 
 BP
 
Efficient Corruption 

А 
 
 P
 
Totalitarian Corruption 

А 
= 
 P
 
Bona Fide 

P 
= 
BP
 
Bona Fide 

A 
= 
BP
 
Conflict-free model 

A 
= 
P
 
Analyzing Tabl. 1, we see that is currently being implemented four directions of model-
ing corrupt behavior from the five theoretically possible ones. We have: BM (principal is bo-
na fide, agent is mala fide), M1M2 (M1 ≠ M2), M1M2 (M1 = M2) and BB. 
Let us consider the model MB, based on the assumptions of principal’s mala fides and 
agent’s bona fides (
P 
 
BP
, 
А 
 
BP
). 
Definition 3. Bona fide agent’s actions violating the rules of regulation created by the 
mala fide principal will be called quasi-corrupt behavior. 
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Definition 4. The model, which examines bona fide agent’s behavior in institutional 
conditions created by mala fide principal, will be called quasi-corruption model. 
It follows from the Def. 3 that in conditions of quasi-corruption agents have discretion-
ary power broader than in totalitarian case. Therefore analysis of the applying of this power 
may enable us to determine the main directions of the changing of regulatory policy and, re-
spectively, regulation rules. 
The introduction of the model of quasi-corruption allows us to complete the construc-
tion of a typology of corrupt behavior models, which is based on the methodology of the 
agency relationships. 
Table 2 
The Typology of Models of Corrupt Behavior, Based on the Methodology of the Agen-
cy Relationships 
Principal Agent Model Title 
Bona Fide 

P 
= 
BP
 
Bona Fide 

А 
= 
 BP
 
Conflict-free model 

A 
= 
P
 
Mala Fide 

А 
 
 BP
 
Bureaucratic corruption 

А 
 
 P
 
Mala Fide 

P 
 
BP
 
Mala Fide 

А 
 
 BP
 
Efficient Corruption 

А 
 
 P
 
Totalitarian Corruption 

А 
= 
 P
 
Bona Fide 

A 
= 
BP
 
Quasi-Corruption 
 
А 
 
 P
 
Having finished the construction typology of models of corrupt behavior we can devel-
op another path of the algorithm of second type EACE, corresponding to the mala fide princi-
pal case (first three steps the same as Fig. 1, Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 3. The Rest of Algorithm of Extended Anti-Corruption Expertise of a Regulatory 
Tool with Accumulated Enforcement Practice: the Case of Mala Fide Principal 
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3. The Extended Anti-Corruption Expertise of Public Procurement Issues: 
the Case of ‘Highest Bid – Lowest Bid Scoring’ 
Let us apply the algorithm of EACE to two legal instruments regulating the determining 
of a winner in the tender. The algorithm of extended anti-corruption expertise supposes the 
preliminary identification of the principal’s bona fides. To do that we have to model the prin-
cipal’s preference order on the base of rules of regulation and compare it with the basic prin-
cipal’s preference order. 
3.1. Step 1: The Problem Definition 
Below we consider the linear scoring rule in the form of “Highest bid – Lowest bid 
scoring”. The rule gives maximum score to the best bid and minimum one – to the worst bid, 
and scores all other bids proportionally their distance from the worst bid (Dini at al., 2006, p. 
309). 
In Russia this rule was introduced by guidelines on assessment of bids and qualifica-
tion of suppliers, participating in public procurement tenders, which were enacted by the letter 
of Ministry of Economic Development from June 2, 2000 №AS-751/4-605 (hereafter – Rule 
1), and applied before the introduction of the new rules, approved by the Government Decree 
on September 10, 2009 № 722. 
Besides this, under federal law on concession agreements of July 21, 2005 №115-FZ 
similar rule is used in the evaluation of participants’ bids in public-private partnership pro-
jects to date (art. 32-5) (hereafter – Rule 2). 
We’ll apply to the linear scoring rule the algorithm of extended anti-corruption exper-
tise of the first type (Fig. 1) and identify whether it is possible to obtain the contract which is 
best for the basic principal in the conditions of proposed regulation. 
3.2. Step 2: Mathematical Modelling of Basic Principal’s Preference Order 
We will start from the basic principal’s preference order modelling1. Let us assume 
that the basic principal is able  
1) to formalize the supplied good as a bundle of finite number of its specifications (for the 
simplicity reasons only, let us include into the bundle the time of delivery, volume and du-
ration of the warranty, operation and, may be, utilization costs and so on) 
  ,,,,2,1,,,,, 2121 niin DDDDxniDxxxxx    
there the Cartesian product A × B of sets A and B is the set of all ordered pairs (a, b), 
where a A and b B; 
2) to point out the feasible sets iD
~
for every specification:  
.
~~~~
,,,2,1,
~
21 niii DDDDxniDDx    
The set of outcomes of the procurement procedure     ,,0,,  pDxpxA  
Where: x is a formalized description of the supplied good and p is the price by which a con-
tract is awarded, and its elements (x, p) we’ll call, correspondingly, set of contracts and con-
tracts. 
                                                 
1
 This section is simplified consideration of principal’s preferences modelling. The more rigour consideration 
can be find in (Ivanov, 2015).  
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Denote by p0 the initial (maximum) contract price which usually should be included into 
the procurement notice. Let us introduce into consideration the set ],0[
~~
0pDA  , each point 
of which a=(x, p) is acceptable contract for the basic principal. 
Suppose that on a set X  XA~  a preference order 
BP
 of the basic principal is defined. 
We put forward the following assumptions about its properties. 
1. BPPO is reflexive (Varian, 1992, p. 95): the basic principal is indifferent be-
tween every two identical contracts. 
Since above we assumed that the bundle of good’s specifications contains all specifica-
tions essential to the buyer, it is natural to assume that, by comparing the two contracts that 
match the content, terms and cost of delivery, he considers them as indifferent to each other. 
2. BPPO is complete and transitive (Ibid.). 
The Russian public procurement legislation demands that contracting authority must be 
able to rank the received bids on the base of tender documentation. Hence, agent’s prefer-
ences are supposed to be complete and transitive, and, a fortiori, basic principal’s preferences 
must possess these properties. 
Thus, given these assumptions, the preferences of the basic principal on the set of con-
tracts A can be represented by his indifference map – symbolized set of indifference sets of 
the subject on which the arrow indicates the direction in which lie strictly more preferred al-
ternatives for him (Ivanov, 2015). 
Consider a bidding for the purchase of differentiated goods. We restrict ourselves to the 
case which considers all qualitative characteristics beginning from the second as selecting cri-
teria. This assumption means that any two acceptable contracts   Apx ~,  , which differ by 
values of characteristics xi (i = 2, 3, ..., n) only, are indifferent to each other. 
Thus, the quality of purchased goods may be described by a single numerical character-
istic x1=q and, respectively, any contract can be represented as an ordered pair of numbers: a 
= (q, p). We assume that q varies in the set [q0, +) and the contract, which ceteris paribus 
corresponds to the larger value of characteristic q, is strictly more preferred for the basic prin-
cipal. 
Definition 5. We call that contract a
1
=(q1, p1) dominates contract a
2
=(q2, p2) (a
1 a2), if 
both inequalities q1  q2 and p1  p2 are true. 
Definition 6. We call that the preference order is strictly monotonic
2
, if for any contracts 
a
1
 and a
2 
such that a
1
 dominates a
2
 then a
1
  a2. 
Let us additionally assume that BPPO is strictly monotonic, continuous (Varian, 1992, 
p. 95) and convex (Ibid, p. 96). 
Since by monotonicity assumption an arbitrarily small increase (decrease) of the con-
tract price (ceteris paribus) gives to the basic principal a strictly less (more) preferable con-
tract, the set of indifference, representing his preference order, does not contain interior 
points, and the term "indifference set" may be replaced by the term "indifference curve". 
Thus, given assumptions, basic principal’s indifference curves are the graphs of strictly 
monotonically increasing, continuous, concave functions and his indifference map looks like 
follow. 
                                                 
2
 This definition differs from the traditional definition of strong monotonic preference order (Varian, 1992, p. 
96); however, since it does not lead to confusion, the name of the property has not changed. 
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Fig. 4. Basic Principal's Indifference Map: the Case of Differentiated Goods 
Thus, the indifference map tells how much extra money society is ready pay for extra 
quality and how much is not ready. 
3.3. Step 3: The Identification of the Principal and Agent 
The main features of the modern Russian public procurement system were formed un-
der the influence of PPL-1. After the Law took in force, the Ministry of Economic Develop-
ment was authorized to develop policy in the public procurement (or, other words, to be a Co-
ordinator of public procurement policy) and the Federal Antimonopoly Service – to be a Mon-
itor of the public procurement. The Coordinator and the Monitor, the Bureaucrats in their na-
ture, played a so active role in interpretation and implementation of PPL-1 that we have to 
identify them closer to the principal than to the agent. 
As a result, the Russian Federation developed a system of regulation of public procure-
ment with the aggregate Principal consisting of political and legal elite, Coordinator and Mon-
itor and the aggregate Agent consisting of regional public procurement authorities and bodies 
governed by public law. 
We refer to the regional public procurement authorities as an agent because, on the one 
hand, they have a very limited discretion power, and, on the other hand, they were authorized 
not only to coordinate and control regional public procurement but also to act as a public buy-
er. 
3.4. Step 4: Mathematical Modelling of the Principal’s Preference Order 
Let us move on the modelling of the principal’s preference order if he prescribes to ap-
ply the linear scoring rule. 
We suppose that there are two awarding criteria (quality and price) and the principal’s 
preference order can be modeled by utility function, which attributes to each supplier’s bid 
a=(q, p) the following score: 
  ,PwQwaU pq   (1) 
Where: wq and wp – the weights of awarding criteria defined by the agent under some re-
strictions established by the principal, 
Q and P – the scores of the same scale, assigned to the values of criteria according to the scor-
ing rule. 
Suppose that selecting stage of the tender have passed N (N > 1) suppliers with bids (q1, 
p1), …, (qN, pN). We designate 
.max,min,max,min
1
max
1
min
1
max
1
min i
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i
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Let us start from the variant of the rule which was applied in RF for public procurement 
tenders (Rule 1). In this case the scoring rule takes following expression: 
  ,91,911101
minmax
max
minmax
min
minmax
min 









pp
pp
P
qq
qq
qq
qq
Q ii
ii
i  (2) 
Where: qi and pi – the i-th supplier’s quality and price bids, Qi and Pi – the i-th supplier’s 
quality and price score. 
It is clear that for both criteria the Rule 1 assigns to the worst bid score 1, and to the best 
bid – score 10. For what reason the rule was named “linear scoring rule” stems from the geo-
metric interpretation drawn on the Fig. 5a-5b. 
  
Fig. 5a. Rule 1 for the Increasing Criterion Fig. 5b. Rule 1 for the Decreasing Criterion 
Let us consider the variant of linear scoring rule which is applied in RF for concession 
tenders (Rule 2). In this case the rule takes following expression: 
.,
minmax
max
minmax
min
pp
pp
P
qq
qq
Q ii
i
i





  (3) 
It is clear that for both criteria the Rule 2 assigns to the worst bid score 0, and to the best 
bid – score 1 (Fig. 6a-6b). 
  
Fig. 6a. Rule 2 for the Increasing Criterion Fig. 6b. Rule 2 for the Decreasing Criterion 
Proposition. If the selecting stage of the tender have passed two bidders, and principal 
prescribes to compare their bids by the linear scoring rule, then the principal is mala fide. 
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Proof. Let us consider an arbitrary contract a
1
 = (q1, p1) (q1 ≥ q0). The BPPO can be 
modelled by the ordinal sets of contract a
1
 (strictly better set B(a1), indifference set I (a1), and 
strictly worse one W(a1)) (Fig. 7). 
 
Fig. 7. Basic Principal's Ordinal Sets 
Let us consider an arbitrary contract a
2
 = (q2, p2) (q2 ≥ q0), different from a
1
. The Princi-
pal assigns scores to bids following way (1):   .PwQwaU pq   
We assume that wq > wp (the other case wq ≤ wp is considered the same), and the linear 
scoring rule is applied in the form of Rule 2 (the other case is considered the same). 
We have: 
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Thus, the Principal preference order can be modelled by the ordinal sets of contract a
1
 
(strictly better set, indifference set (in this case I(a
1
)=a
1
), and strictly worse one) (Fig. 8). 
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Fig. 8. Principal's Ordinal Sets 
Let us introduce into consideration the set    11 aBaWX PBP

   and the 
set    11 aWaBY PBP

  . It is easy to prove that these sets are not empty (we’ll prove it for 
the first set). 
Actually, consider the contract a*=(q*, p*), such that a* IBP(a
1
) and q* > q1. Then the 
contracts a=(q*, p), (p > p*) belong to the set  1aWBP

 and to the set  1aBP

 at the same 
time. 
Thus, for any contract    112 aBaWXa PBP
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 (Fig. 9). 
 
Fig. 9. The Principal's Mala Fides Illustration 
Hence, according the Def. 1, the Principal is mala fide. 
18 
 
Thus, if there are only two bidders, the agent by means “Highest bid – Lowest bid scor-
ing” cannot award the contract which optimal for society. 
3.5. Step 5: Amendments to the Legal Act  
Thereby the amendments in the regulation tool are necessary. It is clear that in the case 
of two awarding criteria the linear scoring rule can be applied only if three or more bidders 
are taking part in the tender. 
Thus, the Principal may demand from contracting authority to designate in the tender 
documentation 
 the minimum number of suppliers’ bids for the tender to be performed (Model Law, 53-j); 
 that in the case of two bidders, who passed the selection stage, the other scoring rule has 
to be applied. 
These amendments are especially important for the public procurement system of RF, 
which is characterized by the lack of competition (Tabl. 3). 
Table 3 
Tenders’ Performance in RF (for federal contracting authorities) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Competition in the 
tenders (bids/tender) 
2.18 2.07 2.04 2.24 2.27 
Source: Federal State Statistic Service3. 
After making the corresponding amendments to the guidelines on assessment of bids 
and qualification of suppliers, participating in public procurement tenders, the principal can 
move to the traditional anti-corruption expertise, aimed at identifying and eliminating corrupt 
factors. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The paper proves a necessity of changing the approach to anti-corruption expertise: an 
analysis of opportunities for mala fide agent’s behavior and evaluation of incentives for his 
bona fide behavior have to be completed by the assessment of possibility of making a best 
choice for the society in terms of regulation proposed by the principal. 
In the paper two different algorithms of extended anti-corruption expertise have been 
introduced: first one is applied to the new regulation tool (Fig. 1), second one – to the regula-
tion tool which has been used and some information on enforcement practice is available 
(Fig. 2-3). In both cases the expertise starts from the modelling of society’s preferences and 
comparing them with the principal’s preferences generated by the proposed regulation. 
The paper refines the typology of models of corrupt behavior (Tabl. 2), based on the 
methodology of the agency relationships, proposed in (Ivanov, 2015), and clarifies interde-
pendence between type of corruption and aims of agent’s behavior modelling in the process of 
extended anti-corruption expertise. 
In the paper the algorithm of extended anti-corruption expertise of a new regulatory tool 
has been applied to the two legal instruments regulating the determining of a winner in the 
tender in the RF. 
                                                 
3
 http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/main/. 
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The implementation of main steps of the algorithm of extended anti-corruption expertise 
of a regulatory tool with accumulated enforcement practice (Fig. 2-3) can be found in the 
(Ivanov, 2012), where quasi-corruption model was introduced and applied to the examining of 
case of using English auctions in RF public procurement, and in the paper (Ivanov, 2015). 
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